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A Call To Combine Rhetorical Theory 
and Practice in the Legal Writing Classroom 
Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione* 
[I]n the field of . . . legal instruction a knowledge 
 of theories and techniques is of the greatest importance.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The theory and practice of law have been separated in legal education to 
their detriment since the turn of the twentieth century.  As history teaches us 
and even the 2007 Carnegie Report perhaps suggests, teaching practice with-
out theory is as inadequate as teaching theory without practice.2  Just as law 
students should learn how to draft a simple contract from taking Contracts, 
they should learn the theory of persuasion from taking a legal writing course.3  
In an economy where law apprenticeship has reverted from employer to edu-
cator, legal writing courses should do more than teach analysis, conventional 
documents, and the social context in which lawyers write.  The  legal writing 
professor’s task is to impart to her students the intellectual ballast necessary to 
navigate complex analytical challenges in the workplace.  By combining rhe-
torical theory and practice in the legal writing classroom, the professor can 
pique students’ interest, hasten their learning, and help them develop transfer-
able skills better than teaching by imitation alone.  In addition, teaching the 
rhetorical nature of law in a legal writing course helps students debunk sooner 
the myth of “black letter law” in their doctrinal courses.  Finally, as the Car-
negie Report indicates, a more holistic approach to teaching can best “blend 
the analytical and practical habits of mind that professional prac-
tice demands . . . .”4 
 
 *   Professor of Legal Research and Writing at Georgetown University Law Center and the author of 
Rhetoric for Legal Writers: The Theory and Practice of Analysis and Persuasion (2009). 
 1. Charles B. Nutting, Training Lawyers for the Future, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 7 (1953). 
 2. When legal educators refer to The Carnegie Report, they refer to a recent study on legal education 
published by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching’s Preparation for the Professions 
Program.  See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS 15 (2007).  Among other things, the 
report indicates that law schools responded to criticism in the 1950s that they were not providing “sufficient 
grounding in practice” by adding practical skills courses “with no attention to the relation of these practices 
with theory.”  See id. at 91–92. 
 3. “Legal writing” in this Article refers for convenience’s sake to courses taught with or without a 
research component. 
 4. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 97. 
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This Article begins with a brief history of the separation of theory and 
practice in the law classroom and the impact that it has had on the quality and 
reputation of writing as its own subject.  The Article argues that despite a 
wave of pedagogical advances, legal writing as its own subject has ample 
room to grow.  For legal writing courses to achieve intellectual maturity, they 
must incorporate rhetorical theory.  To ignore it is to confirm Plato’s suspi-
cion that rhetoric is a discipline without a subject matter and to enable the in-
sidious undervaluing of our profession.5  As detailed below, there are several 
advantages to teaching legal writing as rhetoric.  Although not the focus of 
this Article, a corollary advantage may be to help legal writing faculty achieve 
academic equality, which benefits teacher and student alike.  For a variety of 
reasons, this Article concludes that legal writing professors are responsible for 
teaching both practical skills as well as the theories that inform them. 
II.  THE SEPARATION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LEGAL EDUCATION 
Since Christopher Langdell, the Dean of Harvard Law School from 1870 
to 1895, introduced the idea that the study of law is akin to science, law 
school educators have taken a decidedly theoretical approach to teaching 
law.6  Langdell’s belief that true principles of law could be articulated by ex-
amining judicial decisions gave rise to the case and Socratic methods of 
teaching.7  Although Langdell’s students initially disliked his approach, they 
came to appreciate it.8  The case method treated his students as excavators, as 
opposed to scribes, of the law, and the Socratic Method gave students permis-
sion to have opinions of their own.  Langdell’s methods turned out to be better 
for teaching students to “think like lawyers” than to discern legal principles.9  
Nevertheless, by the mid-1890s, law schools across the country began to 
adopt Langdell’s methods.10  More than 100 years later, the Socratic Method 
has fallen somewhat into disfavor and disuse for a variety of reasons, but the 
theoretical approach to teaching law remains firmly intact.11 
 5. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 6. See, e.g., Charles R. McManis, The History of First Century American Legal Education: A Revi-
sionist Perspective, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 633 (1981); Nutting, supra note 1, at 4 (“I venture to suggest that 
for law school . . . the most practical instruction possible is the most theoretical.”); Patrick J. Rohan, Some 
Basic Assumptions and Limitations of Current Curriculum Planning, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 289, 291 (1964) 
(“Happily the plea for ‘practice schools’ spent itself in the legal publications.”); David S. Romantz, The Truth 
About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 116 
(2003). 
 7. See Bruce A. Kimball, Christopher Langdell: The Case of an ‘Abomination’ in Teaching Practice, 
20 NEA HIGHER EDUC. J. 23, 25 (Summer 2004); Amy R. Mashburn, Can Xenophon Save the Socratic 
Method?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 597, 612 (2008); Romantz, supra note 6, at 105–06, 114–15 (2003). 
 8. See Kimball, supra note 7, at 32–33; Romantz, supra note 6, at 106, 114. 
 9. See Mashburn, supra note 7, at 610–11; McManis, supra note 6, at 633–34; Romantz, supra note 6, 
at 106. 
 10. See Kimball, supra note 7, at 34; Romantz, supra note 6, at 116. 
 11. See, e.g., Benjamin V. Madison, III, The Elephant in Law School Classrooms: Overuse of the So-
cratic Method as an Obstacle to Teaching Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 293, 301 (2008) 
(citing ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP 132–41 
(2007), available at http://www.cleaweb.org/best_practices–full.pdf) (“[A]lthough the Socratic dialogue and 
case method still have their place in legal education, they are not alone sufficient to teach all law students the 
ROBBINS-TISCIONE_MACRO_FINAL 3/29/2011  12:28:14 PM 
2011] A Call to Combine Rhetorical Theory and Practice 321 
 
Having replaced practitioners with scholars as law professors, law 
schools began to realize that despite the benefits of the case method, students 
would need to learn some practical skills too.  As early as the 1920s, some 
law schools offered “bibliography” courses taught by law librarians that in-
troduced students to legal research and sources of law.12  Although writing 
may have been included in these courses, the focus was remedial and proba-
bly did not emphasize “finished legal writing.”13  In 1938, the University of 
Chicago introduced the first modern skills course to combine legal research, 
analysis, and writing.14  It was not designed to improve students’ writing but 
to address the gap in skills training that had resulted from the legal academy’s 
adoption of the case method.15  Northwestern University, too, had a course 
that combined research and writing, but most schools did not follow the Chi-
cago schools’ lead and continued to focus on research and remedial writing.16  
By 1939, about twenty-three law schools taught a course in how to find and 
use law books.17 
Distinct courses in legal writing did not appear until sometime after 
World War II, when it became clear that students in general needed basic 
writing instruction.18  As Professor Marjorie Rombauer has stated, the impe-
tus for legal writing programs was the “substantial influx of older students in-
to the law schools.  When schools relaxed admission standards even more in 
admitting them, they discovered that the students’ writing was a serious prob-
lem.”19  Given student deficiencies in basic writing skills, “law faculties 
grudgingly saw the necessity to become teachers of English grammar 
and composition.”20 
At the same time, law schools began to recognize that in addition to writ-
ing instruction, students needed at least some training in the actual practice of 
law.  The 1953 Report of The Association of American Law Schools 
(“AALS”) Curriculum Committee stated: 
skills and knowledge they need . . . .”); Mashburn, supra note 7, at 621–22 (explaining that since the 1970s, a 
combination of “sociological, political, and psychological forces appear to be putting tremendous stress on 
the dominance of the Professor Kingsfield paradigm”); Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most 
Misunderstood Character in Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956 (2004) (“Among the criticisms leveled 
at the Socratic method in the hands of professors like Kingsfield are that it results in poorly trained lawyers; it 
causes incivility between attorneys; it discriminates against women; and it causes law students to lose their 
ideals.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 12. Romantz, supra note 6, at 128; Marjorie D. Rombauer, First-Year Legal Research and Writing: 
Then and Now, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 538, 539–40 (1972); see also Comm. Curriculum Ass’n Am. Law Sch., 
The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 352 (1945) (recognizing that the “use of the 
library” requires special teaching) (internal quotations marks omitted)). 
 13. See Rombauer, supra note 12, at 540. 
 14. Mary S. Lawrence, An Interview with Marjorie Rombauer, 9 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 19, 21 
(2003); Romantz, supra note 6, at 129; Rombauer, supra note 12, at 541. 
 15. Romantz, supra note 6, at 129. 
 16. Id. at 130. 
 17. Rombauer, supra note 12, at 539 n.7. 
 18. See Romantz, supra note 6, at 128–29; Rombauer, supra note 12, at 540. 
 19. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 21. 
 20. Rombauer, supra note 12, at 540. 
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[T]he question presses whether there were not virtues in apprenticeship training 
which need recapture and which can be recaptured even in the classroom.  It is 
striking that other professions devote much schooling time to . . . the applied 
arts which the student is expected later to practice . . . .  And whatever the defi-
ciencies of the older apprenticeship instruction in law, it did have this value of 
bringing instruction in the craft-skills, in how to do legal jobs well and wisely.21 
Consequently, some law schools developed courses in legal methodol-
ogy that combined research, statutory interpretation, case analysis, synthesis, 
and legal reasoning.22  By the early 1950s, at least forty-four schools offered 
a methods-type course.23
Marjorie Rombauer is considered the founder of the combined legal re-
search and writing programs we are familiar with today.24  Professor Rom-
bauer started teaching at the University of Washington Law School in 1960.25  
Asked by the school’s dean to develop a five-year plan, she was determined 
“to develop the legal writing program into something more substantial than it 
was.”26  In addition to the conventions of writing, Rombauer recognized that 
she was teaching students a complicated process: “[T]he whole, integrated se-
quence of thinking and developing” a legal issue involves research, synthesis, 
analysis, and writing.27  Her book, Legal Problem Solving: Analysis, Re-
search, and Writing,28 demonstrated that legal writing involves “more than 
mechanics and grammar.”29  As Professor Lawrence has stated, Rombauer 
proved that legal writing “could be as academically demanding as any other 
law school course.”30 
Despite a growing awareness that law students needed skills training, 
law schools were generally reluctant to provide it.  First, as legal writing fac-
ulty well know, there was—and continues to be—an “institutionalized con-
tempt for legal writing” among top-tier law schools.31  It is based on the as-
sumption that good writing cannot be taught.  If a student has made it all the 
way to law school and still cannot write, it is probably too late.32  Second, be-
cause writing instruction was largely remedial, law faculties considered 
 21. Comm. Curriculum Ass’n Am. Law Sch., supra note 12, at 364. 
 22. Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 
70 TEMP. L. REV. 117, 132 (1997); Romantz, supra note 6, at 129; Rombauer, supra note 12, at 541. 
 23. Rombauer, supra note 12, at 541 n.18. 
 24. See Lawrence, supra note 14, at 19. 
 25. Id. at 20. 
 26. Id. at 28. 
 27. Id. at 46–47. 
 28. MARJORIE DICK ROMBAUER, LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING: ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND WRITING 
(5th ed. 1991). 
 29. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 19. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Pamela Edwards, Teaching Legal Writing as Women’s Work: Life on the Fringes of the Academy, 4 
CARDOZO WOMEN’S. L.J. 75, 79 (1997). 
 32. Id. at 79–80; see, e.g., J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 
69 WASH. L. REV. 35, 40–48 (1994).  In 1939, William Prosser stated that with respect to students’ poor writ-
ing ability, “[T]here is very little that the law schools themselves can do.  I am still quite certain that for the 
protection of the public these poor unfortunates should never be allowed to graduate from any law school; 
and that the professional gates should continue to be guarded well.”  Arrigo, supra note 22, at 130–31. 
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it boring and unintellectual.33  Third, teaching skills courses required too 
much work.34  Fourth, investing in legal writing programs promised to be ex-
pensive, and law schools were loath to pay the price.35  Chicago, Northwest-
ern, and Rutgers, for example, already had discovered that teaching legal re-
search and writing was labor intensive, and it was obvious that writing 
programs were going to require hiring new faculty.36  Some schools econo-
mized by offering a legal writing course but having upper-class students teach 
it under the supervision of a faculty member.37  By the mid-1980s, however, 
judges, practitioners, and students had put sufficient pressure on law schools 
to provide better skills training, and a host of formalized research and writing 
programs taught by full- or part-time faculty finally emerged.38 
Although early legal writing programs sought to teach both the 
substance of legal analysis and the mechanics of writing, they focused more 
on what to write than how or why, hindered, in part, by the prevailing writing 
pedagogy.  Consistent with the view that writing cannot be taught, educators 
had assumed that writing is the natural result of a well thought-out thesis.39  
Teachers took little interest in the process writers use to create their finished 
products and focused on organization and style.40  This was especially true in 
legal writing, where students were asked to reproduce conventional legal 
documents, such as opinion letters, memoranda, and briefs.  In the 1980s, 
composition theorists started studying the writing process itself and learned 
there are significant differences between expert and novice writers.41  Writing 
pedagogy was thus transformed.  Writing teachers began to intervene in the 
individual writer’s process, assigning multiple drafts of the same assignment, 
 33. Edwards, supra note 31, at 84. 
 34. Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal Writing: Law Schools’ Dirty Little Se-
crets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 6–7 (2001). 
 35. See Arrigo, supra note 22, at 132; JoAnne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gen-
der Bias in Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 565 (2000); Edwards, supra note 31, at 87–88. 
 36. See Arrigo, supra note 22, at 131. 
 37. See id. at 133–34.  As a first-year law student at Georgetown, my legal writing instructor was a 
third-year law student.  By the time I graduated in 1987, full-time faculty had been hired to teach le-
gal writing. 
 38. See Arrigo, supra note 22, at 119; Durako, supra note 35, at 565; Edwards, supra note 31, at 87. 
 39. See, e.g., James A. Berlin, Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories, 44 C. 
ENG. 765, 765–67 (1982); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of 
Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489, 492–94 (2002); Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 32, at 49. 
 40. In the nineteenth century, Alexander Bain, an English rhetorician, divided writing into four types: 
description, narration, exposition, and argument.  See generally ALEXANDER BAIN, ENGLISH COMPOSITION 
AND RHETORIC 153–256 (Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints 1996) (1871).  Bain’s focus on arrangement led to 
the typical writing teacher’s emphasis on large-scale organization, paragraph structure, and sentence con-
struction.  The “five-paragraph essay” also was conceived during this period.  Ultimately, the four types fell 
into disfavor because they elevated form over substance.  See Robert J. Connors, The Rise and Fall of the 
Modes of Discourse, 32 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 444, reprinted in THE WRITING TEACHER’S SOURCEBOOK 
24, 31–33 (Gary Tate & Edward P.J. Corbett eds., 2d ed. 1988). 
 41. See, e.g., JANET EMIG, THE COMPOSING PROCESS OF TWELFTH GRADERS (1971); DeJarnatt, supra 
note 39, at 501–03; Linda Flower & John R. Hayes, The Cognition of Discovery: Defining a Rhetorical Prob-
lem, 31 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 21, reprinted in THE WRITING TEACHERS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 40, 
at 92–102. 
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commenting on their drafts, and conferencing with students between drafts.42  
A growing interest in communities of writers led to an interest in how one 
becomes an acculturated member of the legal discourse community.43  In 
more recent years, rhetoricians have explored knowledge as the product of 
rhetorical activity within a given community of discourse.44 
Legal writing pedagogy today typically accounts for the individual writ-
er’s process, the legal audience, and, to some extent, the generative aspects of 
writing.  But because legal writing courses aim to prepare students for prac-
tice, they also emphasize “finished legal writing.”45  Accordingly, they tend 
to rely primarily on simulated litigation and transactional settings, writing 
models, and imitation to prepare law.  However, as Professor Rombauer rec-
ognized, legal writing courses should engage in “the whole integrated se-
quence of thinking and developing” legal arguments.46  Just as legal writing 
courses needed to add analysis to mechanics in the 1960s, they now need to 
add the theory that informs good analysis to analysis itself in the twenty-first 
century.  Students may learn to “think like lawyers” in their doctrinal classes, 
but they need “to both act and think well” in legal writing cl 47
III.  COMBINING RHETORICAL THEORY 
AND THE PRACTICE OF LEGAL WRITING 
I hasten to add that the scholarship of legal writing faculty on rhetorical 
theory, both classical and contemporary, has increased dramatically since I 
started teaching in 1994.48  This interest has engendered and inspired my own 
scholarship, but only recently have I tried earnestly to incorporate rhetorical 
theory directly into my teaching, and I suspect I am not alone.  Anecdotally, I 
find my first-year law students expect me to teach them about logic and 
emotional appeals—two aspects of rhetoric with which they are rarely 
familiar—because they intuit their relevance to legal education.  Over the 
 42. See Daniel L. Barnett, Triage in the Trenches of the Legal Writing Course: The Theory and Meth-
odology of Analytical Critique, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 651, 656–57 (2007); Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 32, 
at 51–52. 
 43. See, e.g., Patricia Bizzell, Cognition, Convention & Certainty: What We Need to Know About Writ-
ing, reprinted in ACADEMIC DISCOURSE AND CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 75 (1992); DeJarnatt, supra note 39, 
at 503–04; Joseph Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 
J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1 (1991). 
 44. See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Read-
er and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1999); Richard E. Young & Alton L. Becker, To-
ward a Modern Theory of Rhetoric: A Tagmemic Contribution, reprinted in CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC: A 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND WITH READINGS 123 (W. Ross Winterowd ed., 1975). 
 45. See Rombauer, supra note 12, at 540. 
 46. See Lawrence, supra note 14, at 19. 
 47. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 9. 
 48. See, e.g., Linda A. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law As Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 3 (2010); Michael Frost, Legal Writing Inst. Conf. at Seattle U. School of Law: Intro-
duction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage (July 1996); Terri LeClercq & Anthony Pelasota, Legal 
Writing Inst. Conf. at U. of Tenn. College of Law: Let’s Argue About Argumentation (May 2002); Suzanne 
Rabe,  Legal Writing Inst. Conf., Georgia State U.: From Aristotle to Martin Luther King: Using Letter from 
Birmingham Jail to Teach Aristotle’s Three Modes of Persuasion (June 2006); J. Christopher Rideout, Story-
telling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion,14 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53 (2008). 
ROBBINS-TISCIONE_MACRO_FINAL 3/29/2011  12:28:14 PM 
2011] A Call to Combine Rhetorical Theory and Practice 325 
 
years, my students often expressed disappointment when they realized that my 
course did not yet include rhetorical theory per se, which makes it possible to 
teach not only what is effective but why.  Thus equipped, students feel better 
able to move beyond the legal writing classroom and into the legal 
writing profession. 
A.  Teaching Law Through the Lens of Classical Rhetoric 
Contemporary rhetorical theories are invaluable to law students as bud-
ding storytellers and wordsmiths, but classical rhetoric provides the most nat-
ural framework for teaching legal analysis and argument as a whole.  My 
course is structured around Aristotle’s canons of rhetoric.49  Aristotle did not 
claim to invent rhetoric but to observe it, and the process he described is as 
relevant today as it was in ancient Greece.  According to Aristotle, there are 
three types of persuasive speech based on the nature of the audience to which 
it is addressed: political, ceremonial, and legal argument.50  Each is the prod-
uct of the same five canons or principles of composition: invention, arrange-
ment, style, memory, and delivery (the latter two applying only to 
oral rhetoric).51 
Invention is the most time-consuming and difficult part of the process.  
At this stage, the writer invents supporting arguments known as artistic ap-
peals.52  A writer may rely on inartistic appeals as well, such as confessions, 
oaths, or contracts, but she does not invent these in any creative sense.53  Ar-
istotle further divided artistic appeals into appeals to reason (logos), emotion 
(pathos), and credibility (ethos).54  Next, the writer must arrange or organize 
her arguments, and Aristotle’s idea of arrangement was simple and straight-
forward: first, a statement of the relevant facts and then the argument.55  He 
acknowledged that orators often add an introduction and a conclusion to their 
speeches, and Roman orators added a statement of the issue, an outline of the 
argument, and counter-arguments to the traditional Greek arrangement.56  As 
 49. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE (Lane Cooper trans., Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1960) (c. 
333 B.C.E.). First-year students tend to underestimate the complexity of the analytical process and the num-
ber of concepts they must learn before they even can begin to write.  Despite my struggle to present a cornu-
copia of material in a way beginning law students understand, they often complain that the course is unorgan-
ized and confusing.  Confusing, yes, but unorganized?  Hardly.  Using Aristotle’s canons as the framework 
for teaching the analytical process—from identifying the legal issue to conducting research to polishing a 
document—has helped.  It has made it easier for me to put each seemingly disparate task into a larger and 
more authoritative context. 
 50. See id. at 16–17. 
 51. See generally id. at 143–241.  The great Roman rhetoricians embraced Aristotle’s canons and ex-
panded on them.  See, e.g., [CICERO], RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM 7 (Harry Caplan trans., 1954) (c. 84 
B.C.E.); 2 CICERO, DE INVENTIONE 19 (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1968) (c. 87 B.C.E.); 2 QUINTILIAN, 3 
INSTITUTIO ORATORIA: THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION 23 (Donald A. Russell ed. & trans., Harvard U. Press 
2001) (c. 85 B.C.E.). 
 52. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 8. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 8–9. 
 55. See id. at 220. 
 56. See id.; [CICERO], supra note 51, at 9. 
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for the canon of style, Aristotle said the legal writer must choose an appropri-
ate style with which to arrange her arguments: the overall effect should be 
clear, and the words should seem to come naturally to the speaker.57 
1.  Teaching Legal Analysis and Argument as Invention 
Early in the fall semester, first-year students tend to think that their role 
as legal writers is to report the law they find and that they have no authority to 
characterize it.  In the latter case, a typical student will say, “I thought that 
might be the rule of law, but I could not find a case that specifically said that.”  
One advantage to teaching analysis and argument as beginning with “inven-
tion” is to signal the creative aspect of the lawyer’s process.  Unfortunately, 
the idea that lawyers invent arguments as opposed to simply marshal them has 
been lost to the Western world since the turn of the twentieth century.  Until 
then, rhetoric was taught as the counterpart to philosophy (or dialectic, as the 
ancient philosophers called it). 
Aristotle believed that both philosophy (the quest for knowledge) and 
rhetoric (the art of persuasion) involve the process of invention.  The 
difference is that philosophy produces truth in an absolute or scientific sense, 
whereas rhetoric yields only probable or best truths in the context of human 
affairs.58  Aristotle’s teacher, Plato, despised rhetoric for this reason.  He 
claimed rhetoric was a discipline without a subject matter.  An orator simply 
took knowledge acquired by philosophers and presented it in the way most 
likely to manipulate his audience.59  During the Middle Ages, rhetoric was 
divided into separate subjects: logic, grammar, letter writing, poetry, and 
preaching.60  During the Renaissance, a renewed interest in the ancient world 
led to renewed interest in Aristotle.  Peter Ramus, a French philosopher, 
rejected Aristotle’s view that invention and arrangement belong to philosophy 
and rhetoric.  Because philosophy alone leads to truth, he argued, rhetoric is 
confined to style and delivery.61  In the eighteenth century, the focus of 
rhetorical theory shifted from persuasive writing to language and literary 
criticism due, in part, to Ramus’ view.62  Writing was thus restricted to 
 57. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 185–86. 
 58. See id. at 3. 
 59. See, e.g., Plato, Gorgias, in PLATO, COMPLETE WORKS 803-09 (John M. Cooper ed., 1997) (c. 380 
B.C.E.) (in which Socrates tells Gorgias that oratory is a “shameful” form of “flattery,” a “knack” without 
subject matter, used to achieve just and unjust results); Phaedrus, reprinted in PLATO,  supra at 537-38 (in 
which Socrates tells Phaedrus that orators “artfully make the same thing appear to the same people sometimes 
just and sometimes unjust). 
 60. See JAMES J. MURPHY, RHETORIC IN THE MIDDLE AGES: A HISTORY OF RHETORICAL THEORY FROM 
SAINT AUGUSTINE TO THE RENAISSANCE 89–355 (1974). 
 61. Id.; see, e.g., GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC & ITS CHRISTIAN & SECULAR 
TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 250–51 (2d ed. 1999). 
 62. See, e.g., HUGH BLAIR, LECTURES ON RHETORIC AND BELLES LETTRES xv (Linda Ferreira-Buckly 
& S. Michael Halloran eds. 2005) (1833).  Blair’s Lectures were devoted to topics such as Taste, Style, and 
Structure of Sentences.  See id. at 2, 99, and 110. 
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organization and style, which led to the division between literature and 
composition courses at all educational levels in the United States.63 
At the turn of the twentieth century, legal writing was considered unin-
tellectual and boring for teacher and student.  The belief that writers do not 
invent ideas or arguments made it possible for law schools to jettison the ap-
prenticeship approach to teaching law.  Two hundred years earlier in 1620, 
Francis Bacon introduced the scientific method as a substitute for Aristotle’s 
logic as the source of knowledge, and in the late 1800s, a curriculum based on 
the scientific pursuit of law seemed to make sense.64  At that time, the focus 
of legal education had become knowledge of the law, not its expression.  It 
was assumed that good writing would follow as a natural consequence of 
good thinking, and any remaining problems law students had were simply a 
matter of mechanics.65 
In sharp contrast to Plato and Ramus, Greek and Roman rhetoricians 
conceived of invention as a two-step process.  First, the orator identified the 
issue to be resolved, and then he consulted the common topics—a range of 
generic types of ideas—to create the best available arguments.66  For exam-
ple, an argument could be based on the definition of an object or idea, the 
comparison of two objects or ideas, and the relationship between them.67  In 
addition to the common topics, special topics or arguments were used in par-
ticular types of speech.  Legal argument, for example, relies heavily on the 
special topics of justice and injustice.68  The increasingly complicated process 
of conducting legal research online and in print is akin to consulting the top-
ics.  Once a legal issue is identified, the legal writer consults primary and sec-
ondary sources of law to find and invent various lines of argument.69  Learn-
ing to access and use a countless variety of legal sources in combination is 
often frustrating to first-year students.  This seemingly random process can be 
understood as part of invention as a whole, which the experienced legal re-
searcher learns inevitably comes full circle.  I remind students that the process 
of reading, selecting, and sorting the law they find is itself creative in that it 
involves individual choice. 
 63. Ramus’ influence can be seen today in the allocation of subjects among U.S. college departments: 
invention or the acquisition of knowledge still belongs to philosophy, and style and delivery are divided 
among English, speech, and communications departments. 
 64. See infra Part III.A.1.a.i. 
 65. See supra Part II. 
 66. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 15–16; 3 CICERO, 2 DE ORATORE 315–23 (E.W. Sutton & 
H. Rackham trans., Harvard U. Press 1967) (c. 55 B.C.E.). 
 67. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 15–16, 19, 143, 163, 170; ARISTOTLE, 4 TOPICA 421–80 (Hugh 
Tredennick ed. & trans., Harvard U. Press 1960) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
 68. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 18. 
 69. The Roman rhetoricians were very interested in the nature of legal issues and how to define them.  
Cicero, for example, said that legal issues involve questions of law, fact, or both.  See 2 CICERO, supra note 
51, at 21–25; see also, e.g., 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 51, at 157–59 (expanding on Cicero’s ideas relating to 
the nature of legal issues). 
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a.  Appeals to Reason (Logos) 
The lawyer’s first and foremost tool is logic, which includes deductive 
and inductive reasoning.70  Students have an intuitive sense of what it means 
to be logical, but unless they majored in philosophy or the classics, most do 
not know what that really means.  Once students learn the nature, goals, and 
limitations of both forms of reasoning, they can use them together to create 
effective analysis and argument. 
i.  Deduction 
I have taught always deductive reasoning by encouraging students to or-
ganize their analysis of a given issue based roughly on the traditional acro-
nym, IRAC: identify the issue, state the rule of law, apply it to the facts, and 
then conclude.  What I since have come to understand is that IRAC and its 
more recent iterations, such as CREAC and TREAT,71 are not organizational 
but analytical schemes that properly belong to the canon of invention.  Each 
of these acronyms is a kind of shorthand for the categorical syllogism, which 
Aristotle wrote extensively about in Prior Analytics and Posterior Ana-
lytics.72  The idea behind the syllogism is that if you know something about 
the relationship between A and B (the major premise), and something about 
the relationship between C and A (the minor premise), you may be able to 
draw a valid conclusion about the relationship between B and C (conclu-
sion).73  In order for the conclusion to be valid, both premises must be indis-
putably true, and the reasoning must be logical.  Only three terms can be 
compared at a given time, and there is a set of rules for determining the valid-
ity of the rea 74
 70. In legal analysis, deduction usually involves the application of a general rule of law to a specific set 
of facts to reach a conclusion, whereas induction involves using a series of observations to generate a hy-
pothesis or general rule from a series of outcomes.  See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS 
45–50 (3d ed. 1997); EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN 
STUDENT 32–33 (4th ed. 1999). 
 71. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY DESANCTIS, OBJECTIVE LEGAL WRITING AND 
ANALYSIS 95–117 (2006); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 100–03 
(5th ed. 2005). 
 72. See generally ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS (Hugh Tredennick ed. & trans., Harvard U. Press 
1962) (c. 350 B.C.E.); ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS (Hugh Tredennick ed. & trans., Harvard U. Press 
1962) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
 73. JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE 
ADVOCACY 6–7 (1993). 
 74. These rules involve the proper use of distributed and undistributed terms, which, for example, pre-
vent conclusions being made about all Cs based on the evidence relating to only some Cs.  See, e.g., 
CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 70, at 43–46.  Although a bit foreboding at first, they are not difficult to 
master, and Venn diagrams can be used to illustrate the same concepts.  In fact, if all first-year students learn 
about syllogistic reasoning is that no more than three terms can be compared at one time and both premises 
must be reasonable, they will have learned a great deal.  Most law students sense when their reasoning is 
“off” or invalid.  For a more detailed discussion of valid and invalid deductive reasoning, including typical 
fallacies in legal writing, see Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to 
Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 493–531 (2003) and KRISTEN K. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, 
RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 114–18, 150–70 
(2009). 
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In legal analysis, the major premise is often a general rule of law (If a 
person makes a false statement that damages the reputation of another (A), 
that person is liable for defamation (B).).  The minor premise is usually a 
statement of the relevant facts (Charles (C) made a statement that injured the 
reputation of another (A).).  The conclusion is the result of applying the major 
premise to the minor premise (Charles (C) is liable for defamation (B).). 
Here, even though there are only three terms of comparison, and the reasoning 
is valid, the conclusion is only probably true.75  In contrast to categorical syl-
logisms, legal syllogisms are rarely, if ever, based on indisputably true prem-
ises.  Advocates for opposing parties rarely agree on the nature of the legal 
rules (the major premise), and as long as both rules are reasonable, one cannot 
be truer than the other.  The parties even may disagree about the facts (the 
minor premise).  Although legal syllogisms produce probable conclusions, 
they are the most powerful form of legal reasoning.  If the audience accepts 
the truth of the stated premises, and the writer’s reasoning is valid, the audi-
ence will accept the writer’s conclusion as sound.76 
Legal writing faculty often debate the value of using analytical shorthand 
to teach deductive reasoning.  Opponents claim that acronyms such as IRAC 
reduce legal analysis to formulaic thinking and mislead students into thinking 
legal analysis lacks complexity.77  To me, this debate misses the point.  Each 
of these acronyms is designed, in its own way, to teach students to reason as 
syllogistically as possible.  First-year law students are often reluctant to em-
brace what they perceive to be the organizational dictates of their particular 
writing professor.  They have been highly successful in their writing thus far, 
and they are reluctant to change their basic approach.  Making explicit the 
link between the acronym and the nature and power of the syllogism is thus 
paramount.  When students understand these “dictates” are a heuristic for syl-
logistic reasoning and why it is effective, they are more likely to embrace the 
use of the acronym and write better. 
As an alternative or in addition to formal logic, students can read the 
work of informal logician-philosophers, Stephen Toulmin or Chaim 
Perelman.  Toulmin and Perelman recognized that in everyday life, people 
pay no attention to the number of terms being compared and whether they are 
using distributed or undistributed terms.  Focusing on legal argument, 
Toulmin set out to determine what connection formal logic has to the way 
people make and assess arguments in everyday life.  In Uses of Argument, 78 
 75. Because a legal syllogism can establish probable truth only, a logician would consider this induc-
tive reasoning.  See, e.g., WAYNE A. DAVIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 42 (2007).  However, since all 
forms of proof in legal reasoning lead only to probable truth, lawyers tend to use deduction to mean the ap-
plication of general rules to a set of facts and induction to mean generalizing a rule from a set of spe-
cific outcomes. 
 76. See, e.g., CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 7 , at 38–43; GARDNER, supra note 73, at 6. 0
 77. See generally Legal Writing Inst., 10 SECOND DRAFT, Nov. 1995, available at 
http://www.lwionline.org/publications/seconddraft/nov95.pdf (publishing a series of essays on the question-
able value of using IRAC to teach legal writing). 
 78. STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT: UPDATED EDITION 90 (2003). 
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Toulmin concluded that an argument usually begins with evidence or data 
used to back up a claim (D → A).  In order to support the claim, one often 
relies on a warrant (W) to explain why the claim is valid.79  When the warrant 
is not absolute, a qualifier (Q) is used, and rebuttal arguments (R) often are 
anticipated.80  Where the warrant is not convincing, one often includes a 
backing (B).81  In Toulmin’s terms, the legal syllogism above would be 
diagrammed as follows:82 
 
Charles’ false accusation (D) → may lead (Q) to liability for defamation. (C) 
↓ 
False statements that injure reputation are defamatory. (W) 
↓ ↓ 
The law does not protect 
false speech. (B) 
Unless the statement 
is proved true. (R) 
 
Chaim Perelman and his partner, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, also focused 
on legal argument to determine if it is based on some form of traditional logic.  
In The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation,83 they concluded that all 
forms of reasoning, including jurisprudence and judicial decisions, are 
rhetorical.84  Because legal scholars and judges often disagree about what the 
law should be or what is fair in a given case, they must use informal methods 
of reasoning to convince their audience of the rectitude of their position.85  As 
soon as a philosopher “tries to influence one or more persons, to orient their 
thinking, to excite or calm their emotions, to guide their actions, it belongs to 
the realm of rhetoric.”86  Perelman found that argument usually begins with a 
meeting of the minds—a series of premises on which the parties do agree.87  
The scholar or judge then selects which premises to emphasize and which 
arguments to advance.88  Once he establishes his arguments, he must create a 
convincing link between them either by association (by analogy) or 
 79. Id. at 91–93. 
 80. Id. at 93–94. 
 81. Id. at 95–96.  In 2002, Professors Terri LeClercq, from the University of Texas School of Law, and 
Anthony Pelasota, from the Thurgood Marshall School of Law, gave an interesting presentation on Toulmin’s 
work and how to use it in the legal writing classroom.  See LeClercq & Pelasota, supra note 48. 
 82. See supra III.A.1.a.i. 
 83. CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS–TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON 
ARGUMENTATION (1969). 
 84. See id. at 45–47 (1969); see also CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES 13 
(1979); CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 162 (1982); James Berlin, Rhetoric and Ideology in the 
Writing Class, reprinted in THE WRITING TEACHER’S SOURCEBOOK 9 (Edward P.J. Corbett, Nancy Myers & 
Gary Tate eds., 4th ed. 2000) (explaining that rhetoric can “never be a disinterested arbiter of the ideological 
claims of others because it is always already serving certain ideological claims”). 
 85. See PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES, supra note 84, at 14. 
 86. PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC, supra note 84, at 162. 
 87. See PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES, supra note 84, at 15–17; PERELMAN & 
OLBRECHTS–TYTECA, supra note 83, at 65–83. 
 88. See PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES, supra note 84, at 17–18; PERELMAN & 
OLBRECHTS–TYTECA, supra note 83, at 115–20. 
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disassociation (by distinguishing cases or situations).89  Legal audiences, in 
particular, are quick to point out any relevant information that has 
been left out. 
ii.  Induction 
Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), a philosopher and practicing attorney, 
was the first to reject logic as a major source of knowledge.  He argued that 
categorical syllogisms demonstrate the relationship between existing things 
but do not create anything new. 90  He urged scientists to reject Aristotelian 
logic and substitute induction: the careful observation of a series of particular 
outcomes that leads to a more general conclusion about the nature of some-
thing.91  Induction occurs at two critical points in the students’ analytical pro-
cess.  The first takes place during the pre-writing or research stage.  For each 
new assignment, students search statutes, cases, administrative regulations, or 
other relevant materials for applicable rules of law.  As they piece them to-
gether, they form a unique and general conclusion about the law.  Lawyers 
tend to call this process case or rule synthesis.92  However, as the eighteenth-
century philosopher David Hume argued, even a rule based on induction is 
only probably true because one cannot be sure that the rule will not change in 
the future.93  In the context of law practice, for example, opposing parties of-
ten disagree on the applicable “rule,” because they tend to phrase it from their 
particular point of view. 
The second point at which induction occurs is with analogical reasoning.  
Our common law system and the doctrine of stare decisis require that like 
cases be treated alike.  Therefore, to predict or argue for a certain outcome, 
the legal writer compares the facts and circumstances of a cited case to the 
case at hand to predict the outcome in her case.  As the number of similarities 
between the cited case and her case increases, the more likely it is that the 
cases are similar and should be treated similarly.94  Comparing factual and 
circumstantial similarities resembles induction because it mirrors the process 
of piecing together specific information to form a general rule or prediction.95 
 89. PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES, supra note 84, at 22–24; PERELMAN & 
OLBRECHTS–TYTECA, supra note 83, at 190. 
 90. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, BOOK I OF THE ADVANCEMENT AND PROFICIENCY OF LEARNING, re-
printed in SELECTED WRITINGS OF FRANCIS BACON 191 (Hugh G. Dick ed., 1955); THE NEW ORGANON, 
APHORISM VIII, reprinted in BACON, supra at 462. 
 91. See, e.g., id.; APHORISMS XIV and XIX at 464-65. 
 92. See, e.g., LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 36–43 (2d ed. 2007). 
 93. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 29 (Tom L. Beauchamp 
ed., 2000). 
 94. See, e.g., CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 7 , at 93–96. 0
 95. They differ in that rule synthesis involves piecing law together to form a rule to explain past case 
outcomes, and analogy involves piecing together facts and circumstances to predict outcome in the writ-
er’s case. 
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b.  Appeals to Emotion (Pathos) 
Aristotle taught that appeals to reason alone are often insufficient to 
convince an audience.  One also must get the audience “into the right state of 
mind.”96  Because lawyers must convince their audience to make a favorable 
decision, Aristotle said appeals to emotion are more important to legal than 
other types of speech.  He said lawyers should study the range and complexity 
of human emotion so they could arouse that emotion in others, particularly in 
judges.97  Most of Rhetoric explores human emotion, and Aristotle incorpo-
rated by reference his work on syllogistic reasoning in Prior and Posterior 
Analytics.98  Convinced that emotion holds the key to persuasion, classical 
and modern rhetoricians have been intrigued with Aristotle’s interest in pa-
thos ever since.  Quintilian, for example, said that the rhetoric that reigns su-
preme in the courtroom is that which moves men to tears or anger.99  Bacon 
said the goal of rhetoric is to “apply [r]eason to [i]magination for the better 
moving of the will.”100  John Locke, an empiricist like Bacon, agreed that to 
stir a person to uneasiness and action requires arousal of emotion.101  Con-
temporary theorists, too, have explored the power of poetic appeals to bridge 
the inadequacy of language, spark emotion or the imagination, and ulti-
mately persuade.102 
Legal writing programs already teach students to appeal to emotion in a 
number of concrete ways.  Several of these techniques are best grouped to-
gether and identified as such.  For example, they teach students common per-
suasive techniques such as formulating a theory of the case; characterizing le-
gal issues, facts, and rules of law from the client’s point of view; and adding 
non-legal and policy-based arguments.  Each of these techniques tries to put 
the audience in the right state of mind and motivate it to act.  The “theory of 
the case” is the Occam’s razor of persuasion.  It expresses in simple terms the 
essence of the advocate’s logical, emotional, and ethical appeals and is often 
dominated by emotion.  For example, there is a critical difference between a 
case characterized by the prosecution as premeditated murder and by the de-
fense as an abused spouse’s desperate escape.  Differing theories and rules of 
 96. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 91. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS, supra note 72; ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, supra 
note 72. 
 99. 3 QUINTILIAN, 6 INSTITUTIO ORATORIA: THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION 47 (Donald A. Russell trans., 
Harvard U. Press 2001) (c. 85 B.C.E.). 
 100. BACON, supra note 90, at 309. 
 101. See 1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 304–07 (Dover Pubs., Inc., 
1959) (1690). 
 102. See, e.g., GEORGE CAMPBELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC 89–112 (Lloyd F. Blitzer ed. 1988) 
(demonstrating that metaphor and its inherent appeal fill a gap created by the inadequacy of language); 
RICHARD M. WEAVER, LANGUAGE IS SERMONIC 225 (Richard L. Johannesen et al. eds., 1970) (explaining 
that sincere emotional appeals are both powerful and ethical because they can move men toward noble ends).  
Indeed, much of legal writing’s current pedagogical interest in metaphor and storytelling can be viewed as a 
continued interest in the rhetorical power of emotional appeals.  See generally Berger, supra note 48; Ride-
out, supra note 48. 
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law may be reasonable in a given case, but the most persuasive ones are those 
that resonate best with the audience.  Even arguments based on public policy 
or non-legal evidence help put audiences in the right frame of mind because 
they explain how a particular outcome will best achieve justice or a feeling 
of fairness.103 
In recent years, I have had a small number of students equate the use of 
persuasive techniques with manipulation.  I would not have identified their 
reluctance as discomfort making emotional appeals.  The instinct to tell sto-
ries, put facts in context, and seek sympathy seems so natural, I was surprised 
to hear law students say it makes them uncomfortable.  I now ask students di-
rectly about their views on emotional appeals.  A small group of students usu-
ally indicates that to characterize facts and the law from their client’s point of 
view feels wrong somehow.  When asked why they feel that way, students of-
ten say appealing to emotion feels dishonest or they do not believe it will af-
fect the decision maker.  Putting the latter reason aside (as it involves an en-
tirely different issue), I suggest that without realizing it, these students have 
adopted Plato’s view—still alive and well—that rhetoric is an evil tool of ma-
nipulation and deceit.  They also may suspect, as Plato did, that legal argu-
ment lacks value, in part, because it does not prove anything with certainty.104  
These students understandably find themselves in an ethical dilemma.  I sug-
gest, however, that if rhetoric produces a form of best truth in human affairs, 
then each party’s perspective is both valuable and essential to the rhetorical 
process.  Our legal system is premised on the assumption that juries sort out 
arguments and counter-arguments to find truth.  Any point of view that strains 
credibility or borders on the unethical is likely to be rejected by a judge or ju-
ry.  Obvious exaggerations of fact and misstatements of law are rejected out-
right.  Even if truth in law is only probable, it may be the best we can do. 
c.  Appeals to Credibility (Ethos) 
Much of what legal writing students are already taught about ethics and 
professionalism falls into the category of appeals to credibility.  Aristotle said 
that to be persuasive, a speaker must be trustworthy.105  A speaker who ex-
udes virtue appears trustworthy, and a speaker who appears to care, among 
other things, about justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom, exudes vir-
tue.106  According to Aristotle, trust “should be created by the speech itself, 
and not left to depend” on the speaker’s reputation.107  Cicero said a speaker 
must choose “the style of oratory best calculated to hold the attention of the 
 103. For a more detailed discussion of emotional appeals in legal writing, including non-legal and policy 
arguments, see ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 74, at 179–201. 
 104. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 105. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 8, 91. 
 106. Id. at 46–47. 
 107. Id. at 8–9. 
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audience.”108  Quintilian developed an even broader view of ethical appeals.  
He said a speaker must be credible in life as well as in the courtroom in order 
to persuade.  Quintilian’s ideal, “a good man, skilled in speaking,” was a man 
free from vice, a lover of wisdom, a believer in his cause, and a true servant of 
the people.109  Today, legal writers often rely on written argument to per-
suade the audience, which is trained to question and doubt them.  Everything 
about their argument must evince character and integrity: the law must be au-
thoritative, accurate, and comprehensive, and the facts must be stated accu-
rately—supported and without exaggeration.  A lawyer’s credibility often is 
judged from the outside in, and for that reason, the document itself must look 
professional.  Finally, the legal writer must be mindful of ethical constraints 
and obligations as a member of the practicin
Legal writing faculty already teach students these techniques.  They 
stress the need to cite adequate supporting law, avoid exaggeration or specula-
tion as to facts, speak the language of the legal community, pay attention to 
detail and the mechanics of writing, consult procedural rules and citation 
manuals, and conform to page limits.  Invariably, law students resist instruc-
tion in some of these areas.  Identifying them as techniques necessary for 
credibility puts them in a broader, more authoritative context.  Teaching law 
using Aristotle’s canons also makes it natural to examine the ethical rules re-
lating to written advocacy.  For example, Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from making arguments that advance a 
client’s position at the cost to another client,110 and Rule 11 of the Civil Rules 
of Federal Procedure requires lawyers to certify their arguments are well 
grounded and their facts supported by evidence.111  More importantly, Rule 
3.3 of the Model Rules requires lawyers to disclose to the court any contrary 
authority that is not disclosed by opposing counsel.112 
2.  Teaching Conventional Legal Documents as Arrangement 
Aristotle said that once a speaker invents his argument, he must arrange 
it.113  He identified traditional speech as having an introduction, statement of 
facts, argument, and conclusion.114  Aristotle said the introduction “paves[s] 
the way for what follows[,]”115 and Quintilian said its function is to “prepare 
the hearer to be more favourably inclined towards us for the rest of the 
 108. 4 CICERO, 3 DE ORATORE 77 (H. Rackham trans., 2004) (c. 55 B.C.E.). 
 109. 5 QUINTILIAN, 12 INSTITUTIO ORATORIA: THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION 197–99 (Donald A. Russell 
ed. & trans., 2001) (c. 85 B.C.E.). 
 110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2008). 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)–(4). 
 112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2). 
 113. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 220. 
 114. See supra Part III.A. 
 115. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 221. 
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proceedings.”116  The statement of facts in a law court should be “brief, clear, 
and plausible . . . .  [O]ne must refrain no less from an excess of superfluous 
facts than from an excess of words.”117  Roman orators often included next a 
statement of the issues and an outline of the arguments to follow.118  The 
argument itself is the focal point of the speech.  Aristotle said that individual 
arguments function like proofs (either inductive or deductive), and the choice 
of arguments depends on the nature of the issues involved.119  To prevent 
logic from overwhelming the audience, he advised speakers to weave in 
appeals to pathos and ethos.120  Roman orators addressed counter-arguments 
separately and inserted them next.  According to Quintilian, it is harder to 
rebut an argument than to make one because “wounding is easier than curing 
the wound.”121  Finally, a speaker concludes to make the audience “well-
disposed,” emphasize his most favorable arguments, put the audience in the 
right frame of mind, and refresh the audience’s memory.122 
Contemporary legal documents are derived from these principles of clas-
sical rhetoric.  Indeed, the traditional legal memorandum mirrors almost ex-
actly traditional Roman legal argument: Question Presented, Statement of 
Facts, Brief Answer, Discussion (including a preliminary outline of the argu-
ments to follow), and Conclusion.  Students often complain about the redun-
dancy inherent in the traditional memorandum, questioning the need to master 
each of its components.  It helps students to understand that the traditional 
memorandum is a direct descendent of classical speech, designed to entertain 
and persuade live audiences through emphasis and repetition.  To the extent 
these redundancies cease to make sense today, legal writers deviate from the 
norm and often use shorter, more efficient forms for conveying legal advice 
such as informal memoranda and e-mail.123 
3.  Teaching the Legal Community’s Expectations as Style 
Teaching style to law students is never easy.  Style is the one aspect of 
their writing that students cling to after a few months in a legal writing course.  
However, as Aristotle recognized, stylistic choices must be grounded in the 
audience’s expectation, and one should speak clearly and appropriately under 
the circumstances.124  Aristotle said clarity is achieved using ordinary words 
 116. 2 QUINTILIAN, 4 INSTITUTIO ORATORIA: THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION 181–83 (Donald A. Russell ed. 
& trans., Harvard U. Press 2001) (c. 85 B.C.E.). 
 117. 2 CICERO, supra note 51, at 57–59. 
 118. See, e.g., 2 CICERO, supra note 51, at 63. 
 119. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 232–33. 
 120. Id. at 234. 
 121. 2 QUINTILIAN, 5 INSTITUTIO ORATORIA: THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION 469 (Donald A. Russell ed. & 
trans., Harvard U. Press 2001) (c. 85 B.C.E.). 
 122. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 240. 
 123. For a more detailed discussion of arrangement in legal writing, including large- and small-scale 
organization, see ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 74, at 213–57. 
 124. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at 185. 
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and simple, straightforward sentences.125  In contrast, Roman audiences pre-
ferred a more literary, ornate style.  Cicero said the choice of style should 
vary, depending on the speaker’s goal: a plain style should be used for con-
veying information, a middle style for entertaining, and a high or vigorous 
style for persuasion.126  Cicero’s own high style was distinguished by com-
plex sentence structures and the use of figures of speech, known as schemes 
(alliteration) and tropes (metaphor).127 
During the Middle Ages, the focus of rhetoric shifted from legal argu-
ment to Christianity, and a plain, simple style was considered appropriate for 
preaching because it distinguished it from Roman rhetoric.128  During the Re-
naissance, the humanists (teachers and scholars of grammar, rhetoric, poetry, 
history, and philosophy) studied the style of the great classical orators, par-
ticularly Cicero.  Lorenzo Valla, an Italian humanist, argued that the early 
Christians need not have rejected pagan eloquence, only its teachings.129  As 
Bacon ushered in the Scientific Age, he advocated the return to a plain and 
simple style of speaking and writing in science and law.130  By the nineteenth 
century, the focus of rhetoric shifted once again from Christianity to litera-
ture,131 and rhetoricians spent years cataloguing a multitude of schemes and 
tropes, several of which are common today in legal writing.132 
Aristotle’s canon of style teaches that regardless of subject matter, the 
reader’s stylistic preference matters, not the writer’s.  Although students may 
have perfected “their own writing style” as undergraduates, that style is rarely 
appropriate for a legal audience.  Today’s legal audience is no less demanding 
than Isocrates’ or Cicero’s.  First, legal readers demand clarity and 
conciseness.  Clarity most easily translates to plain English, and law students 
must learn the complicated task of translating convoluted legal concepts and 
restating them in simple terms, avoiding Latin phrases, jargon, and 
redundancy.  Being concise has the dual advantage of saving the reader time 
and intensifying meaning.  Saying no more than necessary forces the reader to 
make intentional choices and reduces the likelihood of being misunderstood.  
Second, like any discourse community, the legal profession has its own way 
 125. Id. at 185–86.  The “ten Attic Orators” were native Greeks from Attica in the fourth and fifth centu-
ries B.C.E.  THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 212 (Simon Hornblower & Antony Spawforth eds., 3d ed. 
1996).  They were well known for their pure and simple writing style.  See, e.g., ISOCRATES, Against the 
Sophists, in 1 ISOCRATES 62 (Michael Gagarin ed., David Mirhady & Yun Lee Too trans., 2000) (c. 392 
B.C.E.) (one of the ten Attic orators).  Aristotle’s assumption that clarity is easily achieved reflects his inter-
est in invention and his belief that words follow as the natural result of logical thinking.  See supra Part II. 
 126. See, e.g., 5 CICERO, ORATOR 357 (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1971) (c. 46 B.C.E.). 
 127. See, e.g., CICERO, For Aulus Licinius Archias, The Poet, reprinted in SELECT ORATIONS 57–70 (C. 
D. Younge trans., 1957) (c. 63 B.C.E.). 
 128. See KENNEDY, supra note 61, at 156; MURPHY, supra note 60, at 51. 
 129. See, e.g., Lorenzo Valla, From The Refinements of the Latin Language, reprinted in RENAISSANCE 
DEBATES ON RHETORIC 40 (Wayne A. Rebhorn ed. & trans., 2000) (1440). 
 130. BACON, supra note 90, at 181. 
 131. See, e.g., BLAIR, supra note 62. 
 132. See, e.g., RICHARD SHERRY, A TREATISE OF SCHEMES AND TROPES (1550). 
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of speaking and writing.  Law students must learn these conventions and 
conform to rules of grammar and punctuation to be credible.133 
B.  The Advantages to Teaching Law as Rhetoric 
The Carnegie Report endorses integrative teaching models because they 
unite the cognitive, practical, and ethical-social aspects of law.134  Combining 
rhetorical theory and practice in the legal writing classroom is integrative be-
cause it treats each aspect of law as inseparable from the other.  Using classi-
cal rhetoric, the cognitive, practical and ethical aspects of each assignment 
can “be linked so seamlessly that each contributes to the strength of the oth-
ers, crossing boundaries to infuse each other.”135  Although the case method 
challenges students to think critically, it often ignores the practical, ethical, 
and social implications of a given case.  As the Carnegie Report states, stu-
dents often are confused about when and where their moral concerns and 
compassion are relevant.136  Depending on the nature of the assignment, legal 
writing students may or may not be asked to consider the social or ethical im-
plications of their client-based arguments.  More importantly, students may 
not be taught why certain forms of argument are more persuasive than others, 
where they come from, and how to choose among them.  The combined ap-
proach makes it easy to incorporate the logic, psychology, emotion, language, 
and ethics of persuasion. 
This approach also helps students better appreciate the rhetorical nature 
or uncertainty of law and understand the similarities between their doctrinal 
and skills courses.  Students enter law school assuming they will learn what 
they come to call “black letter law.”  Taking a course in torts, for example, 
and learning the law of one state or the majority rule in the United States tend 
to reinforce that assumption.  The case and Socratic teaching methods com-
bine to encourage students to think of the law as abstract—existing outside 
the context of a given case.137  Despite classroom discussions about weak-
nesses in judicial reasoning and different points of view, students persist in 
believing theirs is a simple task: to learn what the law “is” in order to apply it, 
especially on an exam. 
Legal research and writing is the outlier.  It is different, and students 
admittedly do not know what to expect from it.  Surely, they know how to 
write, so they assume legal writing will not be substantive or challenging.  
They think it may involve learning legal lingo or citation format.  Within 
 133. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of style and mechanics in legal writing, see Judith 
D. Fischer, Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to Unprofessionalism in Lawyers’ Papers, 
31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997); ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 74, at 259–302; Kristen K. Robbins-
Tiscione, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 257, 275–84 (2002). 
 134. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 191. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 187. 
 137. See id. 
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weeks, however, they realize legal writing is not as straightforward as it 
seemed.  They struggle to induce their first synthesized rules of law (usually 
in the context of a simple objective memo problem) and choose the “right” 
cases to discuss.  It becomes clear that in legal writing, at least, the rule of law 
is not fixed; it can be articulated in a number of ways.  As students observe 
colleagues citing different cases in support of the same legal rules and analo-
gizing to different cases to predict the outcome in the same case, their task be-
comes complicated, confusing, and uncertain. 
Teaching law as rhetoric, however, allows students to reconcile the 
seeming inconsistency between torts, for example, and legal writing.  Despite 
institutional indications to the contrary, not even torts professors believe they 
can discern true principles of torts law; indeed, the law is no more fixed in 
torts than it is in legal writing.  As Perelman and modern and post-modern le-
gal philosophers have demonstrated, the law is co-extensive with legal argu-
ment.138  In Ramus’ terms, invention may belong to philosophy, but philoso-
phy belongs to rhetoric.  Even a cursory exposure to the legal rhetoric of 
realism, critical legal studies, and critical race theory, for example, demon-
strates the indeterminacy of law in doctrinal as well as legal writing courses.  
The thrust of these theories is that law is judged as right or wrong, fair or un-
fair, based on one’s particular point of view.  Karl Llewellyn, one of Real-
ism’s great scholars, said to his students, “It will be [the judges’] action and 
the available means of influencing their action or of arranging your affairs 
with reference to their action which make up the ‘law’ you have to study.”139  
Critical legal studies went further to say the law is never neutral because it 
represents only one point of view, and it is usually the majority view.  Duncan 
Kennedy, for example, said, “Teachers teach nonsense when they persuade 
students that legal reasoning is distinct, as a method for reaching correct re-
sults, from ethical and political discourse in general . . . .”140  Charles Law-
rence, a distinguished scholar of critical race theory argues that the law is in-
herently racist because racism pervades the majority’s worldview.141  As 
legal writing students become familiar with the concept of law as indetermi-
nate, they are able to generalize that concept to the law of torts and their other 
first-year clas
 138. See supra Part III.A.1.a.i. 
 139. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 5 (1960). 
 140. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 40, 47 
(David Kairys ed., 1982). 
 141. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection Reckoning with Unconscious Ra-
cism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 235, 238 (Kimberlé 
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Teaching legal writing as the practice of specialized skills and “the rela-
tion of these practices with theory” has multiple benefits.142  Classical rheto-
ric provides a natural framework for teaching the complicated process of per-
suasion in the legal context.  It makes legal writing more substantive and 
interesting to students because it relies on more than imitation to teach.  It al-
lows students to consider all the modes of appeal—logical, emotional, and 
ethical, their ability to persuade, and why.  Rhetorical theory hastens students’ 
understanding of the law as indeterminate in and out of the legal writing class-
room.  The combination of theory and practice in legal writing is integrative, 
as The Carnegie Report recommends, because it encourages students to con-
sider the cognitive, practical, ethical and social aspects of lawyering.  Finally, 
it helps fulfill Professor Rombauer’s goal that legal writing be “as academi-
cally demanding as any other law school course.”143  As such, it may be 
even more so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 142. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 92. 
 143. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 19. 
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